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P atent intermediaries have gained importance as non-practicing entities in the innovation domain, buying innova-tions from an external provider and then licensing them to practicing firms. In this study, we analyze the competi-
tion between two identical incumbent firms and a patent intermediary for the acquisition and licensing of a cost-reducing
innovation developed by an external innovator. We show that the outcome of the IP acquisition and licensing game criti-
cally depends on the degree of the cost-reducing innovation. Patent intermediaries win IP rights in patent markets if the
innovation is incremental. They also win the IP rights when the innovation is moderate or radical, providing they have
significant efficiency advantages over incumbent firms and the uncertainty about the degree of innovation is low. We also
show that patent intermediaries serve to make markets more efficient. When the innovation is incremental or moderate,
they help ensure a lower cost of production and a lower price for customers, and when the innovation is radical, they
help increase the profits of the incumbent firms.
Key words: patent intermediary; cost-reducing innovation; degree of innovation; Cournot competition; innovation
management
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1. Introduction
The ownership and licensing of patents have been
discussed in the literature primarily from the perspec-
tive of the innovator (licensor) and firms who operate
in the product market (licensees). However, with the
increasing specialization of roles of firms within the
innovation ecosystem, patents are evolving from
exclusionary instruments that give firms the rights to
be the sole user of innovations to “assets that play a
part in a business strategy and have value as transac-
tional goods” (Monk 2009). Today, an increasing
number of companies treat the IP from patents as a
central business asset that is managed strategically,
and valued and leveraged with a view to generating
returns through active licensing (Monk 2009). This
phenomenon of patent use as part of a business strat-
egy has given rise to a new breed of firms known as
patent intermediaries. These firms acquire and mone-
tize patents, achieving markedly superior scale and
wielding significant influence in the patent market
within relevant technology sectors. They are generally
referred to as patent intermediaries because they are
neither IP creators nor IP consumers (e.g., licensees
and purchasers). At times they are also referred to as
non-producing or non-practicing entities (NPEs). A
category of such firms relies primarily on generating
revenue streams through “enforcing patents against
infringers,” and are known as patent trolls (Fischer
and Henkel 2011).
One reason for the success of patent intermediaries
is their role as market mediators; individual inven-
tors, that are small companies or universities, tradi-
tionally have had a hard time finding buyers or
licensees for the innovations they own (Hagiu and
Yoffie 2013). Since patents are illiquid instruments
with a high degree of uncertainty in valuation (Lem-
ley and Shapiro 2005), there exist opportunities for
intermediaries to make their markets more efficient
by providing inventors with access to buyers of their
intellectual property (Graham and Sichelman 2008).
Patent intermediaries also act as patent distributors,
as patents function as information goods that can be
shared, allowing parties to benefit from arrangements
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like non-exclusive use through licenses to other par-
ties (Wang 2010). However, the business model and
the role of patent intermediaries in fostering innova-
tion have evoked mixed reactions in the literature. On
the positive side, Geradin et al. (2012) find that patent
intermediaries have a nuanced role to play in the
pursuit of innovation, and they can increase competi-
tion by licensing to multiple players, lowering down-
stream prices, and enhancing consumer choice.
Similarly, Reitzig et al. (2010) find that patent
intermediaries exploit information asymmetries in
technology markets, in order to gain patent-based
competitive advantages, and have sustainable busi-
ness models. Nell and Lichtenthaler (2011) summa-
rize the role played by patent intermediaries from the
perspective of technological knowledge characteris-
tics, and differences between product markets and
technology markets. They show that intermediaries
play an important role in technology transfer, as
transferring technologies is more complex than trans-
ferring products.
In contrast, Bessen et al. (2011) find that non-prac-
ticing entities (NPEs) who rely on litigation (patent
trolls) have caused high litigation and damage costs
to technology companies and reduced innovation
incentives. Reitzig et al. (2007) also find that patent
trolls can only operate when the courts have an unre-
alistic consideration of the trade-offs faced by firms
using the technologies for which related patents are
owned by the intermediary. We do not consider the
business model of patent trolls in our study. We focus
on patent intermediaries whose primary business
model revolves around generating revenues through
licensing patents to multiple practicing firms, and
who perform one or more services that connect the IP
creators and the IP consumers (Millien and Laurie
2008).
Patent intermediaries focus on connecting parties
that wish to monetize existing patent rights, which
helps rights holders in exploiting their patents.
Such patent intermediaries can be divided into four
broad groups: (i) brokers, who play a bridging or
market-making role for producers and consumers
of intellectual property, (ii) defensive aggregators,
who acquire patents and license them to their sub-
scribers, providing subscribers with freedom of
operation and safety from litigation, (iii) offensive
aggregators, who develop and acquire patents to
realize revenue through licensing, and (iv) IP advi-
sory, IP consulting, IP management, or technology
transfer firms (Millien and Laurie 2008, Wang
2010). An example of a patent aggregator is RPX
Corporation; its business model revolves around
charging its clients an annual subscription fee, in
exchange for which it identifies patents that might
be threatening to subscribers, acquires them (or the
right to grant sub-licenses) in the open market
from individual or corporate inventors and pro-
vides its subscribers with licenses to those patents.
RPX makes decisions on which patents to acquire
and uses its own capital to acquire them. Impor-
tantly, RPX Corporation has committed not to use
litigation as a means of asserting its IP rights.
Retailers such as Barnes & Noble and Best Buy,
technology firms such as Cisco, IBM, Intel, McAfee,
Microsoft, and NEC and communication firms such
as Nokia, Research In Motion, Samsung, Sony, and
Verizon pay RPX annual subscription fees ranging
from $65,000 to $6.9 million (Hagiu and Yoffie
2013). Allied Security Trust (AST) is another promi-
nent patent intermediary. Other firms in this space
that act as defensive aggregators and participate in
the market as brokers and in advisory roles can be
found in Hagiu and Yoffie (2013).
In this paper, we study the role of a non-troll pat-
ent intermediary on the equilibrium outcome when
two ex-ante identical incumbent firms, that subse-
quently engage in Cournot competition,1 compete
with the patent intermediary to acquire a cost-
reducing innovation. More formally, we develop a
model of a patent market where the external inno-
vator who owns the innovation does not know the
value of the cost-reducing innovation it has devel-
oped. The innovation directly impacts the unit pro-
duction cost of two identical incumbent firms in the
product market. The patent intermediary can also
bid for the innovation and subsequently, license the
innovation to one or both of the incumbent firms.
The external innovator sells the innovation in an
auction to the highest bidder among the incumbent
firms and the patent intermediary. If the patent
intermediary wins the innovation, it can choose to
either license to a single incumbent firm or both
incumbent firms, and if one of the incumbent firms
wins the innovation, it can choose to license it to its
competitor. After the licensing decisions are made
and announced, both incumbent firms compete in a
Cournot framework and experience a lower produc-
tion cost if they have acquired or licensed the
innovation; otherwise, they have a higher unit pro-
duction cost. We identify the optimal bid prices of
the incumbent firms and the patent intermediary for
the innovation, and show that the licensing and bid-
ding strategy critically depends upon the degree of
the cost-reducing innovation.
Interestingly, we show that if the innovation is
incremental, then patent intermediaries always win
the innovation (IP rights) and subsequently license
the innovation to both incumbent firms, thereby maxi-
mizing production efficiency. In contrast, when the
innovation is moderate or radical, the patent interme-
diary will win the innovation only if it has significant
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efficiency advantages in patenting over incumbent
firms, and if the uncertainty about the degree of inno-
vation is low. Additionally, patent intermediaries
serve to increase consumer welfare by lowering the
price of the product for consumers. This can occur
when patent intermediaries win the innovation if it is
incremental or moderate. If the innovation is radical,
patent intermediaries serve to share the overall gains
in the system due to their efficiency in the patenting
process with incumbent firms, thereby increasing
their profits. Hence, patent intermediaries serve to
make markets more efficient in the following manner
(i) when the innovation is incremental or moderate,
they license the innovation to both firms, resulting in
a low cost of production and a lower price for custom-
ers, (ii) when the innovation is radical, they effectively
increase the profits of the incumbent firms.
An important finding of this study is that patent
intermediaries acquire incremental innovations, and
these are licensed to both incumbent firms. Empirical
evidence suggests that patent intermediaries primar-
ily own incremental patents (Graham and Mowery
2003, Hedlund 2007, Reitzig et al. 2007). Our study
provides a theoretical justification for the ownership
of incremental patents by patent intermediaries, and
provides an important basis for forming testable
hypotheses.
2. Literature Review
There is a substantial stream of research that inves-
tigates the interaction of the innovation markets
and IP rights and market mechanisms used by
firms. Our study is similar to this stream of
research, as we study the impact of the degree of
innovation on the existence of patent intermediaries
in innovation markets. Gupta (2008) studies the
impact of knowledge spillovers from manufacturer
investments in cost-reducing innovation on the
channel structure. Arora and Ceccagnoli (2006)
study the relationship between patent protection
effectiveness and technology licensing and find that
high patent protection effectiveness increases tech-
nology licensing if the firms lack complementary
assets to exploit new technologies, while firms that
have complementary assets are less likely to license
technologies. Fosfuri (2006) finds that the rate of
technology licensing displays an inverted U-shaped
relationship with the number of technology suppli-
ers and is higher for licensors with smaller market
shares. Ceccagnoli (2009) finds that the effect of
preemptive patenting is stronger when incumbents
have high market power and a high threat of
entry, and is lower when R&D competition is char-
acterized by radical innovations. Ziedonis (2004)
examines the role of fragmented ownership of
patents in technology industries and finds that
firms patent aggressively to avoid being curtailed
in their use of innovation.
The literature on cost-reducing innovation has con-
sidered various factors like process improvement
investments, experience or learning curves, the
sources of the technology, and the characteristics of
market and technology. In a monopolistic environ-
ment, Bernstein and Kok (2009) investigate the impact
of procurement approaches on the dynamics of sup-
plier investments in cost reduction when a buyer pur-
chases components from several suppliers, while
Rust et al. (2002) consider the impact of cost-reducing
and demand-enhancing innovations on profitability.
Sinclair et al. (2000) study the impact of process R&D
on experience or learning curves in reducing the unit
cost of production. In contrast, we examine the effi-
cacy of cost-reducing innovations that are acquired
externally in a competitive environment.
In addition to the literature on motivating cost-
reducing innovations, the extant research has also
studied the phenomenon of partnering in the supply
chain on innovations. Geffen and Rothenberg (2000)
find that strong partnerships with providers and ade-
quate incentive systems result in better innovations
that reduce cost. Kim (2000) studies the coordination
of a manufacturer and a supplier on the supplier’s
effort at the innovation, and finds that the incentive of
the supplier for investing in innovation is critically
dependent on the increased demand from the lower
retail price charged by the manufacturer since the
product is produced at a lower unit variable cost. Sim-
ilarly, Lou (2007) finds that the impact of cost-reduc-
ing innovations in the market is vitally dependent on
the excess demand generated by the innovation. Chao
and Kavadias (2008) study conditions under which
firms develop radical (drastic) and incremental inno-
vations, and show that there is a trade-off between
environmental complexity and environmental insta-
bility. There has also been a substantial amount of
research on the structure of innovation markets and
the incentives of firms to invest in innovation, and the
mechanisms of offering products to consumers, as
well as demand-enhancing services (Bhaskaran and
Gilbert 2009, Gupta 2008, Gupta and Loulou 1998,
Terwiesch and Xu 2008, Xia and Gilbert 2007). Erat
and Krishnan (2012) also study the problem of design-
ing award structures to external agents for incentiviz-
ing innovation in the form of contests. We contribute
to this stream of literature by studying the role of pat-
ent intermediaries in innovation markets: under what
conditions of cost-reducing innovation do patent
intermediaries participate in innovation markets?
In the literature on the licensing contracts to be
used, Kulatilaka and Lin (2006) study the optimal
contract design problem from the perspective of an
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incumbent firm engaging in R&D, and find that when
firms can license innovations to competitors, royalty
contracts are optimal if the firm has no external
funding constraint, and royalty contracts with fixed
fees are optimal in the presence of budget constraints.
The analysis of the licensing of patents is not limited
to the technology domain. Kumar and Turnbull
(2008) study the role of characteristics of financial
innovations on the decision to patent and license
innovations, and find that for certain sets of charac-
teristics, it is optimal not to patent and license inno-
vations even if the option is available. Our study
contributes to this stream of literature by considering
the impact of the nature of the innovation and the
business model of the licensor on the licensing strat-
egy of the licensor. When an external innovator owns
the innovation, Kamien et al. (1992) find that fixed-
fee licenses dominate quantity-dependent licenses
from the perspective of the innovator. Kamien and
Tauman (1986) find that when the external innovator
is a Stackelberg leader, fixed-fee contracts dominate
quantity-dependent contracts. Sen and Tauman
(2007) find that for external innovators, the optimal
licensing policy is quantity-dependent for relatively
significant innovations. Kabiraj (2004) shows that if
the innovator is external, quantity-dependent licens-
ing contracts dominate fixed-fee and auction con-
tracts for non-drastic innovations, and auctions are
optimal for drastic innovations. Xiao and Xu (2012)
explore how royalty revisions affect the incentives
and profits in a R&D and marketing alliance between
a marketer and an innovator and find that the alli-
ance structure affects the royalty rate. In a similar
vein, Savva and Scholtes (2014) study contractual
arrangements for joint new product development
between an innovator and a technology firm, and
explore how an option to opt out of the contract can
mitigate some disadvantages of traditional licensing
arrangements. Erat and Kavadias (2006) study the
competitive aspects of the market for new technology
by exploring the scenario when a technology supplier
wishes to license the technology to competing down-
stream buyers. We add to this stream of literature by
considering the impact of patent intermediaries in
the supply chain structure for innovation. In this
study, the optimal licensing contracts are based on
fixed-fees only, as monitoring costs for royalty-based
contracts can be high (Leffler and Rucker 1991).
In the literature on the impact of the degree of inno-
vation on the licensing strategy, Katz and Shapiro
(1985) find that if incumbent firms engage in R&D
activity, any resulting radical innovations will not be
licensed, and incumbent firms find it optimal to
license incremental innovations to their competitors
using fixed-fee licensing schemes. Kamien et al.
(1992) model the innovator as an external firm (as in
this paper), but assume that the innovator knows the
value of the innovation. They investigate the optimal
number of licenses to be offered by such an innovator,
along with the price at which the licenses should be
offered. They characterize the optimal number of
licenses, and differentiate innovations to be either
drastic or non-drastic. In contrast to this stream of
literature, our focus is on the role of patent intermedi-
aries. Therefore, we study the case in which external
innovators do not know the value of the cost-reducing
innovation to the incumbent firms. Hence, the innova-
tor does not have the intent or ability to use contracts
to license the innovation and focuses on selling the
innovation to the highest bidder, who can then license
the innovation to other firms.
Finally, when academic units form NPEs, scholars
have examined the role of university R&D and their
patenting and technology licensing strategies (Coly-
vas et al. 2002, Mowery et al. 2002, Sine et al. 2003).
Belderbos et al. (2004) classify the net outcome of
degree of innovation depending on the parties
involved, and find that cooperation with suppliers
typically results in incremental innovation, while
firms cooperating with universities make radical
innovations. Firms cooperating with their competitors
may either make radical or incremental innovations.
We contribute to this stream of research by examining
the patenting and licensing strategies of for-profit
NPEs, and characterize the domains where such
NPEs have viable business models.
The rest of the study is organized as follows. In sec-
tion 3, we describe the model and state our assump-
tions formally. Section 4 contains the formulation,
analysis, and results of the model and the main contri-
butions of the study. Section 5 concludes the study
with a discussion of the findings.
3. Model Description and Assumptions
In this section, we describe the formal mathemati-
cal model in detail and state our assumptions. We
consider an industry that has two identical firms
who are producing the same good, where the ini-
tial per unit cost of production for both firms is c.
A cost-reducing innovation is developed by a inno-
vator firm who is engaged in innovation only, and
does not know the value of the innovation to the
two competing firms. The innovation reduces the
marginal cost of production for the two firms to hc,
where h < 1. After the incumbent, firms choose
their mode of production (if they own the patent
or license the innovation, their unit production cost
is hc, otherwise it is c), they engage in Cournot
competition and face a downward sloping inverse
demand function. A patent intermediary also exists
in the innovation market. We model the problem
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as a four-stage game between the innovator, the
two identical firms and the patent intermediary. In
the first stage, the innovator announces the devel-
opment of the innovation. In the second stage, the
two firms and the patent intermediary offer
their respective bids to the innovator for owning
the innovation, and the innovator awards the inno-
vation to the firm with the highest bid, who then
obtains a patent for the innovation. At the time of
bidding for the innovation, the value of h is uncer-
tain. Once the innovation is acquired and patented,
the value of h is realized. The distribution and the
realized value of h, before and after patenting
(respectively), are common knowledge for the
incumbent firms and the patent intermediary. In
the third stage, if the winner of the patent is one
of the two incumbent firms, it can choose to either
use the patent itself exclusively, or it can choose to
license the patent to its competitor. If the winner of
the patent is the patent intermediary, it can choose
to either license the patent to one of the incumbent
firms only, or license the innovation to both firms.
In the fourth stage, the set of licensees becomes
common knowledge, and the two firms simulta-
neously determine their production levels. The two
identical incumbent firms are referred to as firms 1
and 2, and the patent intermediary is referred to as
PI. Figure 1 depicts the timeline of the four-stage
model.
We make the following assumptions about the
model parameters
A1. The price charged by the two firms in the mar-
ket is given by p(Q) = a  bQ, where Q1 and Q2
are the quantity decisions of the two firms, and
Q ¼ Q1 þ Q2.
A2. The innovation leads to a lower marginal cost
of production hc for the two incumbent firms.
The innovator does not know the value of h to
the incumbent firms.
A3. The value of h is not known to the firms at the
time of bidding (Stage 2) with certainty, but the
incumbents and the PI have a common distribu-
tion on the value of h, with a pdf of f(), mean
of h and a standard deviation of r. The value of
h is known to the incumbent firms and the PI
with certainty after the patent for the innova-
tion has been obtained (Stage 3).
A4. The innovator does not have the intent or
ability to license the innovation directly to the
incumbent firms or the PI, and sells the innova-
tion to one of the incumbents or the PI.
A5. The PI has a cost of kp for obtaining the patent
based on the innovation, while the two incum-
bent firms have a cost of ki for obtaining the
patent. Since the core competence of the PI is
its knowledge of the patenting process, we
assume that kp\ ki (Wang 1998).
A6. The innovator auctions the IP rights to the inno-
vation to the firm that offers it the highest price.
In case of a tie, the innovator arbitrarily allo-
cates the IP rights to one of the firms.
A7. To ensure that the linear price-quantity relation-
ship gives us meaningful results, we assume
that c < a.
A8. The transaction monitoring costs of quantity-
dependent contracts are high, hence, royalty-
based contracts cannot be enforced (Leffler and
Rucker 1991).
4. Model Formulation and Analysis
In this section, we derive the bids made by the two
incumbent firms and the PI to purchase the patent
from the innovator. Our analysis here provides
insights on the factors that support the existence of
patent intermediaries. As described earlier, we model
a four-stage game, and therefore we begin our analy-
sis by looking at the Cournot subgame between the
two incumbent firms in the fourth stage.
4.1. Cournot Subgame in Fourth Stage
In the fourth stage, the two incumbent firms engage
in Cournot competition with their respective unit
costs of production c1 and c2. If either firm has the
right to use the patent, then its unit cost of production
is hc, and if it does not have access to the patent, then
its unit cost of production is c.
Since the inverse demand function is p(Q) =
a  bQ, it can be easily shown that in the fourth-stage
Cournot subgame, the following results hold, by
using first-order conditions. Without loss of general-
ity, let us assume that c1  c2 that is, c1 ¼ c,
and c2 ¼ hc. The profit functions of firms 1 and 2 then
are
Figure 1 Time Line of the Model
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P1 ¼ a bðQ1 þQ2Þ  cð ÞQ1;
P2 ¼ a bðQ1 þQ2Þ  hcð ÞQ2:
Q1 ¼
a2cþhc
3b if a 2cþ hc 0
0 if a 2cþ hc\0;
(
Q2 ¼
a2hcþc
3b if a 2cþ hc 0
ahc
2b if a 2cþ hc\0:
(
The equilibrium profits are
P1ðc1; c2Þ ¼
ða2cþhcÞ2
9b if a 2cþ hc 0
0 if a 2cþ hc\0;
(
P2ðc2; c1Þ ¼
ða2hcþcÞ2
9b if a 2cþ hc 0
ðahcÞ2
4b if a 2cþ hc\0:
8<
:
We now present the results of the analysis of the
prices offered by the incumbent firms and the PI to
the innovator for the rights to acquire the patent, and
the subsequent winner of the rights to the patent,
when the incumbent firms strategically signal that
they will consider licensing the innovation to their
competitor. For our analysis, we delineate the prices
offered for the patent, the winner of the patent, and
the licensing strategy used by it based on the degree
of innovation. The degree of innovation is defined as
incremental if both incumbent firms use the innova-
tion in the fourth stage (if the PI owns the innovation,
it licenses the innovation to both incumbents, and if
one of the two incumbents win the innovation, it
licenses the innovation to the other incumbent). The
innovation is termed as moderate if on winning the
innovation, the PI licenses it to both firms, but if one
of the incumbents wins the innovation, it does not
license it to the other firm. Finally the innovation is
termed as radical if only one firm operates with the
innovation in the fourth stage, and the other firm exits
the market. We show that the existence of the PI in the
market critically depends on the degree of innovation,
and we characterize the above three regions (incre-
mental, moderate, and radical) based on the model
analysis shown below.
4.2. Licensing Strategy
We start the analysis by finding the optimal licens-
ing strategy of the PI if it wins the patent. To find
the optimal licensing strategy of the PI if it wins the
IP rights, assume that it offers a licensing fee T to
firms 1 and 2, and the incumbent firms make their
choices to license from the PI based on this fee. The
following matrix presents the payoff of firms 1 and
2 if both the incumbent firms are operating in the
market in the fourth stage (based on the analysis
presented in section 4.1, note that at this stage, the
value of h is realized and known by the incumbent
firms and the PI).
We now identify if the PI should license the innova-
tion (if it wins the patent) to both firms or only to one
firm. Let TPI1 be the maximum licensing fee that the PI
can charge to ensure that only one of the two firms
enters into a licensing agreement with it. For only one
of the incumbent firms to license the innovation, from
Figure 2, the conditions for a Nash equilibrium imply
that TPI1 has to satisfy are
ða 2cþ hcÞ2
9b
 ða hcÞ
2
9b
 TPI1 ;
ða 2hcþ cÞ2
9b
 TPI1 
ða cÞ2
9b
:
Hence, the maximum licensing fee that the PI can
charge from one firm is the maximum value of TPI1
that satisfies the above inequalities. Therefore,
TPI1 ¼
4ða hcÞðc hcÞ
9b
:
Similarly, let TPI2 be the maximum licensing fee that
firm PI can charge to ensure that both firms enter
into a licensing agreement with it. For both the
incumbent firms to license the innovation, from Fig-
ure 2, the conditions for a Nash equilibrium imply
that TPI2 has to satisfy
ða 2cþ hcÞ2
9b
 ða hcÞ
2
9b
 TPI2 ;
ða 2hcþ cÞ2
9b
 TPI2 
ða cÞ2
9b
:
Firm 1
License Do Not License
Firm 2
License
Do Not License
Figure 2 Incumbent Payoff Matrix for Both Incumbents in the Market
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Hence,
TPI2 ¼
4ða cÞðc hcÞ
9b
:
Note that if the PI wins the patent, it will earn 2TPI2
from licensing the patent to both firms, and
2TPI2  TPI1 ¼ 4ðc  hcÞða  2c þ hcÞ=9b  0: There-
fore, if the PI wins the IP rights, the equilibrium of the
licensing subgame will be such that the PI will set the
licensing fee to TPI2 and its payoff from licensing
the patent to both incumbent firms will be 8ða cÞðc hcÞ9b :
Both firms 1 and 2 in this case will earn a payoff of
ða  hcÞ2=9b  TPI2 ¼ ða  2c þ hcÞ2=9b:
We now focus on the licensing strategy of the
incumbent firms, if one of them wins the innova-
tion. If firm 1 (2) wins the IP rights and decides to
license, its payoff will be ða  hcÞ2=9b þ Ti, where
Ti is the licensing fee charged from firm 2 (1). Firm
2’s (1’s) profit will be ða  hcÞ2=9b  Ti. Since firm
2 (1) will earn a profit of ða  2c þ hcÞ2=9b if it does
not accept the licensing offer, therefore, Ti ¼
ða  hcÞ2=9b  ða  2c þ hcÞ2=9b. Hence, licensing
to the competitor yields a profit of 2ða  hcÞ2=9b
ða  2c þ hcÞ2=9b for firm 1 (2). If the incumbent
firm winning the IP rights does not license to the
competitor, it gets a payoff of ða  2hc þ cÞ2=9b. If
h ≥ 5/3  2a/3c, then licensing to the competitor
yields a higher payoff than the payoff without
licensing, hence, we classify the innovation as incre-
mental if h ≥ 5/3  2a/3c. Labeling such an innova-
tion as incremental is intuitive for another reason:
the innovation does not reduce the cost of produc-
tion for the incumbents substantially, as 5/3  2a/
3c ≤ h ≤ 1. Therefore, if the innovation is incremen-
tal, if one of the incumbent firms wins the patent, it
will choose to license the innovation to the other
incumbent firm. If the innovation is not incremental,
then the incumbent winning the IP rights will not
license the innovation to its competitor. Proposition
1 formalizes this intuition.
PROPOSITION 1. If the cost-reducing innovation is incre-
mental (5/3  2a/3c ≤ h < 1), then if one of the
incumbent firms wins the patent, it will license the
patent to the other incumbent firm. If the PI wins the
patent, it will license the innovation to both incumbent
firms.
Proposition 1 indicates that if the innovation is
incremental, then both incumbent firms will operate
in the market in the fourth stage with a lower unit cost
of production. Since the innovation is incremental, if
one of the incumbent firms wins the IP rights, it will
license the innovation to the other firm, as it finds it
profitable to acquire licensing fees from its competitor
and operate with the lower unit production cost from
the innovation in a competitive environment com-
pared to having an advantage in the unit production
cost. Both the incumbent firms do not attain any bene-
fits from using the innovation exclusively in this case,
as the benefits of exclusive use of the innovation are
outweighed by the higher fee under licensing that the
incumbent firm has to pay in equilibrium. If the PI
wins the innovation, while it can charge a higher
licensing fee from one of the incumbent firms, it pre-
fers to get a lower licensing fee from both incumbent
firms, as twice the lower licensing fee gives it a higher
revenue than the revenues from licensing to one of
the incumbent firms alone. Therefore, if the innova-
tion is incremental, production efficiency will be max-
imized, as both incumbent firms have the lowest unit
cost of production.
As shown in Proposition 1, if h ≥ 5/3  2a/3c, if
one of the incumbent firms wins the innovation,
licensing to the competitor yields a higher payoff for
the winner than the payoff without licensing
(ða  2hc þ cÞ2=9b). If h < 5/3  2a/3c, licensing to
the competitor yields a lower payoff to the winning
incumbent firm, hence, if h < 5/3  2a/3c, if one of
the incumbent firms wins the innovation, it will use
the innovation exclusively. This gives us one of the
boundaries for classifying a moderate innovation
(h < 5/3  2a/3c); the lower boundary for classifying
a moderate innovation is found as follows. Since only
one firm operates with the innovation in the fourth
stage of the game, the other firm with higher unit
production cost of c will operate in the market only
when its production quantity (and hence, profits) in
the Cournot game is positive, otherwise it will exit the
market. The condition for this is obtained from
the equilibrium quantities of the Cournot game in
section 4.1 (if a  2c1 þ c2\ 0 where c1 ¼ c, c2 ¼ hc,
then Q1 ¼ 0). This condition yields that h [ 2  ac.
Hence, the innovation is labeled moderate when
2  a/c < h < 5/3  2a/3c. Again, the classification
of a moderate innovation is intuitive, as it defines a
region where the unit cost of production is reduced
moderately by the innovation. The payoff matrix in
this case is still represented by Figure 2. We character-
ize the licensing strategy of the incumbent firms and
the PI if they win the IP rights in Proposition 2.
In what follows, for ease of exposition, we adopt
the following notation: Incremental Innovation
fhi  h\ 1g, where hi ¼ 53  2a3c ; Moderate Innova-
tion fhm\ h\ hig where hm ¼ 2  a=c, and Radical
Innovation f0\ h  hmg.
PROPOSITION 2. If the cost-reducing innovation is moder-
ate (hm\ h\ hi), then if the PI wins the IP rights,
it licenses the innovation to both incumbent firms, while
if one of the incumbent firms wins the IP rights, it
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exclusively uses the cost-reducing innovation. Both the
incumbent firms operate in the market.
Proposition 2 highlights that when the innovation
is moderate, both the incumbent firms compete in a
Cournot duopoly after the licensing game. However,
compared to the case of incremental innovation, there
is an important difference when the innovation is
moderate. If one of the incumbent firms wins the
innovation, it will exclusively use the innovation, and
not license the innovation to its competitor, hence,
only one firm uses the innovation in the Cournot sub-
game. In this case, the winning incumbent firm finds
that the benefit from the lower unit production cost
from exclusive use of the innovation is substantial,
and higher than the benefit from the licensing fee it
can charge its competitor and then operate in a
symmetric Cournot subgame with the same unit
production cost.
When the innovation is radical (0\ h  hm), note
that the payoff matrix for the two incumbent firms in
the Cournot subgame is different, as the quantities
produced under equilibrium are not non-zero always
(please refer to section 4.1). Figure 3 presents the pay-
off matrix of both firms 1 and 2 when the innovation
is radical.
As before, we identify the optimal licensing strate-
gies and the associated payoffs for the PI and the
incumbent firms, and subsequently identify their bid
prices for the patent. Proposition 3 summarizes the
outcome of the licensing game when the innovation is
radical.
PROPOSITION 3. If the cost-reducing innovation is radical
(0\ h  hm), then if the PI wins the innovation, it will
license the innovation exclusively to one incumbent. If
one of the incumbent firms wins the patent it will
exclusively use the cost-reducing innovation, hence, the
eventual market structure of the Cournot game is a
monopoly, as the other incumbent firm exits the market.
If the incumbent wins the innovation, Proposition 3
highlights that if the innovation is radical, then the
winner of the innovation will not license the innova-
tion to its competitor, and operate in a monopoly. The
benefit from a lower unit production cost from a radi-
cal innovation is so high that the winning firm prefers
to use the innovation exclusively, as the other firm’s
quantity is driven to zero and it is forced to exit the
market. This result for radical innovations has also
been shown in the literature when the external inno-
vator licenses the innovation to incumbent firms
directly (Kamien and Tauman 1986, Kamien et al.
1992, Katz and Shapiro 1985). Finally, if the PI wins
the innovation, then it will license it to only one of the
incumbent firms.
4.3. Bidding Strategy
In this section, we derive the bidding strategies of the
two incumbent firms and the PI, and identify the con-
ditions under which each of the firms wins the inno-
vation based on their bids. Note that the actual value
of the degree of innovation h is not known with cer-
tainty to the firms at this stage, but the distribution of
h is common knowledge. For ease of exposition, we
assume that the support of the distribution of h is
within the same domain as the mean, h. Hence, if h
is within the incremental region, the support of the
distribution is also within the incremental region, the
same assumption holds for the other two regions.
This assumption is made for tractability, and it is rea-
sonable to assume that the realized outcomes for h
can be predicted to be within the same domain as h.
This assumption essentially captures the notion that
once a innovation is known, the incumbent firms and
PI will have some credible prior knowledge of its
value and hence the realized value of the degree of
the innovation will be in the neighborhood of the
expected value, h. We relax this assumption in section
4.5. Note that the winner of the innovation will incur
the cost of patenting (ki or kp), and hence all parties
will rationally account for this cost to determine their
bidding strategy.
4.3.1. Incremental Innovation. If the innovation
is incremental and the PI wins the IP rights to the
innovation, then it follows from the analysis in section
4.2 that it wins a profit of E½8ða cÞðc hcÞ9b  from the inno-
vation by licensing the innovation to both the incum-
bent firms. Similarly, if one of the incumbent firms
Firm 1
License Do Not License
Firm 2
License
Do Not License
Figure 3 Incumbent Payoff Matrix for Radical Innovations
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wins the IP rights, its total profits are given by the
sum of its own profits and the licensing fees that it
obtains from licensing the innovation to the other
incumbent firm (from Proposition 1, the winning
incumbent firm will license the innovation to their
competitor if the innovation is incremental). Proposi-
tion 4 summarizes the bids of the three firms and
characterizes the winner of the IP rights when the
innovation is incremental.
PROPOSITION 4. If the cost-reducing innovation is incre-
mental (hi  h\ 1), the two incumbent firms will bid
8
9b ða  cÞðc  hcÞ  ki for the IP rights, and the PI will
bid 89b ða  cÞðc  hcÞ  ki þ ,  ! 0þ for the IP
rights. The PI will win the innovation and license the
innovation to both incumbent firms.
Proposition 4 shows that patent intermediaries win
the IP rights to the innovation if the innovation is
incremental. Here, the PI’s expected profit is
ki  kp   [ 0. In practice as well, patent intermedi-
aries have been observed to have patents to incremen-
tal innovations rather than original or radical
innovations in their portfolio (Economist 2011, Gra-
ham and Mowery 2003, Hedlund 2007). While the
extant literature has considered the existence of pat-
ent intermediaries for reasons like making markets
more efficient, providing liquidity, and the market
mediation role as in Hagiu and Yoffie (2013) and
Wang (2010), we show that a critical condition for the
participation of patent intermediaries in patent mar-
kets is the degree of innovation (incremental).
4.3.2. Moderate Innovation. If the innovation is
moderate, again the PI will license the innovation to
both incumbent firms, and win a profit of
E½8ða cÞðc hcÞ9b  from their licensing fees. However, in
this case, if one of the incumbent firms wins the inno-
vation, it will not license the innovation to their com-
petitor, but would prefer to use the innovation
exclusively. Proposition 5 summarizes the bids of the
three firms and characterizes the winner of the IP
rights when the innovation is moderate.
PROPOSITION 5. If the cost-reducing innovation is moder-
ate (hm\ h\hi), then:
(i) if ðc
hcÞð5c 3hc 2aÞþ 3r2c2
9b þ kp  ki [ 0, the two
incumbent firms will bid 13b ½ðc  hcÞð2a  c  hcÞþ r2c2  ki for the IP rights, and the PI will bid
8
9b ða  cÞðc  hcÞ  kP for the IP rights. One of
the two incumbent firms will win the innovation
and use the innovation exclusively.
(ii) if ðc
hcÞð5c 3hc 2aÞþ 3r2c2
9b þ kp  ki\ 0, the two
incumbent firms will bid 13b ½ðc  hcÞð2a  c  hcÞ
þ r2c2  ki for the IP rights, and the PI will
bid 13b ½ðc  hcÞð2a  c  hcÞ þ r2c2  ki þ ,
 ! 0þ for the IP rights. The PI will win the inno-
vation and license the innovation to both incumbent
firms.
Proposition 5 details several interesting features
about patent ownership when the innovation is
moderate. First, note that an increase in the uncer-
tainty in the knowledge of the degree of innovation
(r2) leads to a higher likelihood of one of the two
incumbent firms winning the IP rights, and lowers
the ability of the PI to win the innovation. The intu-
ition behind this result is that the uncertainty in the
knowledge of the degree of the innovation leads to
a higher upside for the two incumbent firms in
their profits in the fourth stage (Cournot competi-
tion), while it does not affect the expected profits of
the PI. This increased upside is reflected in a higher
bid by the two incumbent firms than that of the PI,
compared to the case where the degree of innova-
tion is known with certainty. Second, the two
incumbent firms have a higher chance of winning
the IP rights if the innovation is moderate com-
pared to the case when the innovation is incremen-
tal. This can be deduced from the fact that the gap
between the patenting costs of the PI and the
incumbent firms (ki  kp) has to be higher for the
PI to win the IP rights, compared to the case when
the innovation is incremental. If the PI wins the
innovation (case (ii) of Proposition 5), its expected
profit is ki  kp  ðc hcÞð5c 3hc 2aÞþ 3r
2c2
9b   [ 0.
4.3.3. Radical Innovation. If the innovation is rad-
ical, the PI will license the innovation to only one of
the incumbent firms, and win a profit of
E½ða  hcÞ2=4b  ða  cÞ2=9b from their licensing
fees. If one of the incumbent firms wins the innova-
tion, it will also not license the innovation to their
competitor, but prefer to use the innovation exclu-
sively. Proposition 6 summarizes the bids of the three
firms and characterizes the winner of the IP rights
when the innovation is radical.
PROPOSITION 6. If the cost-reducing innovation is radical
(0\ h  hm), then
(i) if ða cÞ
2
9b þ kp  ki [ 0, the two incumbent firms
will bid 14b ½ða  hcÞ2 þ r2c2  ki for the IP
rights, and the PI will bid 14b ½ða  hcÞ2 þ r2c2 
1
9b ða  cÞ2  kP for the IP rights. One of the two
incumbent firms will win the innovation and use
the innovation exclusively.
(ii) if ða cÞ
2
9b þ kp  ki\ 0, the two incumbent firms
will bid 14b ½ða  hcÞ2 þ r2c2  ki for the IP rights,
and the PI will bid 14b ½ða  hcÞ2 þ r2c2  ki þ ,
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 ! 0þ for the innovation. The PI will win the inno-
vation and license the innovation to one of the two
incumbent firms.
Proposition 6 highlights the impact of a high
degree of innovation (radical) on the bidding poli-
cies of the PI and the incumbent firms. First,
while the uncertainty in the value of the degree of
innovation at the bidding stage increases the bids
of the incumbent firms as well as the PI, since
only one of the incumbent firms will operate in
the fourth stage of Cournot competition with the
radical innovation, both incumbent firms and the
PI increase their bids by the same amount to ben-
efit from the upside of the innovation. Hence, the
uncertainty (represented by a non-zero variance)
has no role to play in deciding whether the PI or
one of the incumbent firms wins the innovation.
Second, the two incumbent firms have the highest
chance of winning the IP rights if the innovation
is radical compared to the cases where the innova-
tion is incremental or moderate. This can be
deduced from the fact that the gap between the
patenting costs of the PI and the incumbent firms
(ki  kp) has to be the highest for the PI to win
the IP rights, compared to the cases when the
innovation is incremental or moderate. If the PI
wins the innovation (case (ii) of Proposition 6), its
expected profit is ki  kp ða cÞ
2
9b   [ 0:
4.4. Impact of Patent Intermediary on Prices and
Profits
We now analyze the impact of the presence of the
PI on the prices offered in the market and the prof-
its of the two incumbent firms and the innovator.
For this purpose, we compare the prices offered in
the market and the profits of the two incumbent
firms and the innovator in the absence of the PI in
Proposition 7.
PROPOSITION 7. The absence of the PI has the following
effects on the prices and profits of the incumbent firms:
(i) if the innovation is incremental, the prices and prof-
its of the incumbent firms are the same as in the
presence of the PI.
(ii) if the innovation is moderate, then the profits of the
incumbent firms are the same as in the presence of
the PI, but the price of the product charged from the
consumers is either the same or higher.
(iii) if the innovation is radical, the price of the product
is the same, but the profits of the incumbent firms
are lower than those in the presence of the PI.
Proposition 7 explores the case when the PI is
absent. If the innovation is incremental, then since
both firms prefer to license to the competitor over
exclusive use of the innovation, therefore both firms
will use the innovation in equilibrium. Hence, the
price in the market will be the same as in the case with
the PI. Note that both firms will offer the same bid to
the innovator and will have the same profits as they
would have in the presence of the PI in the market (so
their profits would be E½ða  2c þ hcÞ2=9b, from
Proposition 4).
If the innovation is moderate, then only one of
the incumbents will use the innovation in equilib-
rium. This is because the incumbent winning the IP
rights prefers to use the innovation exclusively,
and the other incumbent will have a higher unit
production cost. This leads to a lower total quantity
produced, and hence, in the Cournot equilibrium,
the price that consumers will pay for the product in
equilibrium is higher than if the PI was present in
the market. Hence, an important result that we find
is that patent intermediaries increase consumer wel-
fare when the innovation is moderate. When a PI is
present, it prefers to license the product to both
incumbent firms, thereby decreasing the unit pro-
duction cost of both firms, and consequently the
total quantity produced is higher. This reduces the
price the products are offered at, and consumer
welfare increases. Note that both firms will make
their highest bids for the IP rights, and will
therefore again have the same profits in equilib-
rium as they would have in the presence of the PI
in the market (so their profits would be
E½ða  2c þ hcÞ2=9b, from Proposition 5(i)).
If the innovation is radical, then in the Cournot
equilibrium, only one incumbent uses the innova-
tion, and the other incumbent exits the market.
Hence, only one incumbent operates in the fourth
stage in the market. This results in the same quantity
and price outcome as in the presence of the PI.
Hence, if the innovation is radical, prices do not
change in the absence of the PI. However, note that
in this case, the profits of the two incumbents are dif-
ferent: When the PI is not present, then both firms
will always bid the same 14b ½ða  hcÞ2 þ r2c2  ki,
which is higher than what they would bid in the
presence of the PI. Therefore each firm’s expected
profit in equilibrium is lower than that in the case
with the PI. The intuition behind this result is as fol-
lows: in the absence of the PI, if the incumbent firm
does not win the IP rights, it gets a profit of zero. If
it wins the IP rights, at the bidding stage, it gets an
expected profit of 14b ½ða  hcÞ2 þ r2c2  ki from
winning the IP rights. Overall, when the innovation
is radical, the PI lowers the degree of competition
between the incumbents.
Finally, the innovator always Pareto-benefits from
the existence of the intermediary, because if the PI is
absent, the incumbents make the same bids as they
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do in the presence of the PI (they are identical
competitors). However, if the PI wins the innovation,
it makes a higher bid than the incumbents, resulting
in a higher payoff for the innovator.
4.5. Comparative Statics: Effect of General
Uncertainty in Degree of Innovation
In this section, we analyze the impact on the bidding
strategies of the patent intermediary and the incum-
bent firms when the random variable h has its support
in [0,1], i.e., we relax the assumption made in section
4.3 that the support of the distribution of h is within
the same domain as the mean, h. As before, in the
fourth stage, we analyze the Cournot subgame
between the two incumbent firms. Since the value of h
is already realized in the fourth stage, the profits of
the incumbent firms and the patent intermediary
from its licensing policy are the same as in section 4.3.
However, the bidding process and the values bid by
the incumbent firms and the patent intermediary are
different from section 4.3, as h can be in any of the
three regions: incremental, moderate, and radical.
Proposition 8 compares the outcome of the bidding
process between the incumbent firms and the patent
intermediary in this case.
PROPOSITION 8. If the cost reduction (h) can take
any value in [0,1] in the bidding stage, then the PI wins
the innovation if ki  kp  19b ða  cÞ2
R 2ac
0 fðhÞdhþR 5
3 2a3c
2ac
ðc hcÞð5c 3hc 2aÞ
9b fðhÞdh. Else, one of the two
incumbents firms wins the innovation.
Proposition 8 shows that the assumption made in
section 4.3 is not limiting, and the impact of the sup-
port of h being in the region of [0,1] is a combination
of the cases when the value of h is in the incremental,
moderate, and radical regions. Note that, in section
4.3, when the innovation is incremental, the profits of
the incumbent firms and the PI in the fourth stage of
the game (Cournot competition) are the same, and the
PI always wins the innovation as it is more efficient
than the two incumbent firms (kp\ kiÞ: In the moder-
ate and incremental regions, the PI wins the innova-
tion if ðc hcÞð5c 3hc 2aÞ9b þ kp  ki [ 0 and if ða cÞ
2
9b þ
kp  ki [ 0 respectively. Proposition 8 shows that
the bidding strategies of the firms are such that the
bids of the incumbent firms and the PI are the differ-
ences between their profits from having the innova-
tion or not having the innovation in the three regions,
and the condition for winning the innovation is an
expectation of the conditions of winning the innova-
tion in the incremental, moderate and radical regions.
Consistent with the insights provided in section 4.3,
where we show that the PI exists when ki  kp is high
and/or the innovation is either incremental of moder-
ate, in this case we find that the existence of the patent
intermediary in equilibrium is supported by a high
value of ki  kp and/or a shift of the probability dis-
tribution, f(h) toward the right side (shift of the mass
toward the moderate/incremental region, since
1
9b ða  cÞ2  ðc hcÞð5c 3hc 2aÞ9b  0 for 2  ac  h
 53  2a3c). If the PI wins the innovation, its
expected profit is ki kp  19b ða  cÞ2
R 2 ac
0 fðhÞdhR 5
3 2a3c
2ac
ðc hcÞð5c 3hc 2aÞ
9b fðhÞdh  0.
4.6. When Incumbents Do Not Have Perfect
Information about Availability of Innovation
Although in this study, we have assumed that the PI
and both incumbent firms participate in the bidding
process for the innovation, due to high search costs
and/or information asymmetry in markets, it is
plausible that not all incumbents may have perfect
knowledge of the availability of the innovation at the
bidding stage. In this section, we formalize that pos-
sibility and show, consistent with the expected intui-
tion, that this case leads to higher expected profits
for the PI. Interestingly, we find that the higher prof-
its for the PI only occur when the degree of innova-
tion lies in the radical region. The reason for these
insights is as follows: in both the incremental and
moderate regions, the final market equilibrium is a
duopoly. In terms of expected profits, an incumbent
firm that does not win the innovation is indifferent
to whether is loses the innovation to the PI or to the
other incumbent. Therefore, in these two regions, the
PI does not have any additional chance of winning,
and the expected profit of the PI is the same as our
base model. However, the case with radical innova-
tion leads to a monopoly. Moreover, it makes a
difference to an incumbent whether it loses the
inovation to the PI or the other incumbent. If the
innovation is won by the PI, both incumbents, with a
probability of 0.5, stand to make non-zero profits.
This decreases the willingness to pay for the innova-
tion for an incumbent if the other incumbent is
absent from the bidding process. Therefore, the con-
ditions for the existence of the PI are more relaxed
and its expected profit is higher when compared to
our base model.
To model this case, we assume that only one incum-
bent participates in the bidding process with a proba-
bility of g, and both the incumbent firms enter the
bidding process with a probability of 1  g. We do
not consider the case where none of the incumbents
enter the bidding process as that yields to a trivial
analysis and insights. We also assume that when bids
for the innovation are being submitted, all parties
participating in the bidding process have common
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knowledge of the number of participants (i.e., PI and
one incumbent or PI and both incumbents). The fol-
lowing proposition summarizes our findings in this
case.
PROPOSITION 9.
(i) When only one incumbent enters the bidding pro-
cess, the conditions that determine the existence of
the PI firm remain unchanged for the case with
incremental and moderate innovation (propositions
4 and 5); however, the condition for the radical
innovation changes to ða cÞ
2
18b þ kp  ki\ 0.
(ii) If the probability of one (resp., both) incumbent firm
(s) of participating in the bidding process is g
(resp., 1  g), then if the innovation is in the radi-
cal region: the PI firm wins the innovation if
ða cÞ2
9b þ kp  ki\ 0; if ða cÞ
2
9b þ kp  ki [ 0 and
ða cÞ2
18b þ kp  ki\ 0, then the PI wins the innova-
tion with a probability of g; if ða cÞ
2
18b þ kp
ki [ 0, then the PI never wins the innovation.
When the innovation is in the incremental and
moderate regions, the conditions that determine
whether the PI wins the innovation remain
unchanged (Propositions 4 and 5).
(iii) If the probability of one (resp., both) incumbent firm
(s) of participating in the bidding process is g
(resp., 1  g), then the expected profit of the PI
remains unchanged in the case with incremental
and moderate innovation; however, the expected
profit for the PI, conditional on winning the inno-
vation, for the case with radical innovation
increases to
g ki kpða cÞ
2
18b
 
" #
þð1 gÞ ki kpða cÞ
2
9b
 
" #
:
5. Conclusions and Future Research
In this study, we investigate the role of patent inter-
mediaries in innovation. Specifically, we seek to
understand under what conditions of innovation pat-
ent intermediaries play a role in innovation markets.
We develop a model of the licensing of a cost-reduc-
ing innovation by a innovator who does not know the
value of the patent to two incumbent firms who
engage in Cournot competition in the market. We also
model the existence of a PI and assume that the inter-
mediary and the two incumbent firms have common
priors on the value of the innovation to both firms. By
analyzing the subsequent game between the different
parties as a simultaneous game, we characterize: (i)
the licensing fees offered by the two incumbent firms
and the PI to the innovator, and (ii) based on the
offered bids by the incumbents and the PI, the winner
of the patent and its subsequent licensing policy. This
enables us to characterize the conditions under which
patent intermediaries exist in innovation markets. We
have used a parsimonious model that provides novel
insights on the relation between the existence of
patent intermediaries and the degree of innovation.
Our findings are as follows. We find that the out-
come of the IP acquisition and the subsequent licens-
ing game critically depends on the degree of the
cost-reducing innovation. For the licensing game, the
following results hold: incumbent firms prefer to
license the innovation to their competitors only when
the degree of the innovation is incremental, meaning
that the cost of producing the product based on the
innovation is not substantially reduced. Under the
same conditions for the degree of innovation, if the PI
wins the patent, it licenses the innovation to both
incumbent firms. Hence, incremental innovations
result in perfectly efficient production. Incumbent
firms will prefer not to license the innovation to their
competitor if they win the IP rights and if the degree
of innovation is above a threshold value. This thresh-
old characterizes the higher boundary demarcating
the region of moderate innovation. If the PI wins the
IP rights, it prefers to license the innovation to both
incumbent firms until a second lower threshold is
reached, demarcating the lower boundary of the mod-
erate innovation region. Both firms prefer to use the
innovation exclusively and the PI licenses the innova-
tion to one of the incumbent firms if the innovation is
radical, meaning that the cost of producing the prod-
uct based on the innovation is substantially reduced.
For the IP acquisition game, the PI always wins the IP
rights if the innovation is incremental. If the innova-
tion is moderate, the PI wins the IP rights if the uncer-
tainty of the innovation at the bidding stage is low,
and if the efficiency of patenting of the PI (kp) is mod-
erately lower than that of the incumbent firms (ki). If
the above two conditions do not hold, one of the
incumbent firms acquires the IP rights if the innova-
tion is moderate. If the innovation is radical, the PI
only wins the IP rights if it is significantly more effi-
cient compared to the incumbent firms. Our results
are summarized in Figure 4.
Our results have a number of implications. First,
note that the PI always wins the IP rights when the
innovation is incremental ðhi  h\ 1Þ. Empirical evi-
dence suggests that patent intermediaries indeed own
innovations of low quality (Graham and Mowery
2003, Hedlund 2007). However, patent intermediaries
also own innovations of high quality (Fischer and
Henkel 2011), showing that efficiency of patenting
also plays an important role in the sustainable
business model of patent intermediaries when the
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degree of innovation is high. When the innovation is
moderate or radical, the PI wins the IP rights only
when it is significantly more efficient at patenting
than the incumbent firms and the uncertainty about
the degree of innovation at the bidding stage is low.
An extension of our base model shows that the PI
firm’s ability to win the innovation may be improved
if there is some information asymmetry in the innova-
tion market that may lead to only one incumbent
participating in the bidding process. However, we
find that this happens only in the case with radical
innovation, where incumbent firms prefer losing the
innovation to the PI compared to losing it to each
other. Our analysis provides a theoretical explanation
for the observation that NPEs who rely on licensing
revenues for their business model take the degree of
innovation into account.
Second, incumbent firms are willing to license the
innovation to their competitor if they win the pat-
ent, but only when the degree of innovation is
incremental. If they win the IP rights to moderate
and radical innovation, they prefer to use the inno-
vation exclusively. In contrast, patent intermediaries
license the innovation to both firms when the inno-
vation is incremental or moderate, and license the
innovation exclusively to one firm only when the
innovation is radical. A third implication of our
results is that when the innovation is incremental,
both incumbent firms will use the innovation and
have a lower unit cost of production, irrespective of
the identity of the firm that wins the patent. Fourth,
patent intermediaries serve two useful functions for
the prices that consumers pay and the profits of the
incumbent firms. When the innovation is moderate,
they lower the prices that consumers pay. When the
innovation is radical, they increase the profits of the
incumbents.
Our results contribute to the extant literature in a
number of ways. First, to the best of our knowledge,
this is the first modeling effort in the area of cost-
reducing innovation that studies the impact of the
degree of innovation upon the role of patent interme-
diaries. Second, we add to the literature on the licens-
ing of cost-reducing innovations and show that in the
presence of a PI, the winner of the rights to the patent
and the subsequent market structure depends on the
degree of innovation—incremental, moderate, and
radical—in a more nuanced fashion than the extant
literature which had focused on two classes of inno-
vation—non-radical and radical.
Regarding the role of the innovator, although the
innovator can replicate the role of the PI by seeking
the patent itself and licensing the innovation to the
incumbents, in practice, innovators may not do so,
leaving that role to third parties. This may in part be
explained by the fact that costs for obtaining the pat-
ent may be substantial for the innovator (may be
higher than that for the incumbents). In addition, the
innovator may want to focus on pure research and
not assume the role of becoming a business partner in
the industry. Finally, finding the right incumbents
and the process of negotiating and writing legal
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contracts may impose additional costs and time
constraints on the innovator.
A number of potential avenues for future research
can be identified. First, the relationship between the
degree of innovation and the existence of PI’s can be
empirically examined. Specifically, longitudinal data
on PI’s (number of firms) can be related to the degree
of innovation in various industries. Our theoretical
results posit that a higher density of PI firms may
exist in innovation markets where the degree of inno-
vation is low. Since, cost-reducing innovations are
generally process-based innovations and hence incre-
mental in nature, another hypothesis from our
research is that PIs exist to a larger extent in process
innovation markets. Next, future research can con-
sider factors such as capital constraints and other
sources of market inefficiency like information asym-
metry, search costs, and litigation (which is the model
adopted by PI firms that act as patent trolls) that may
support patent intermediaries. Also, we have only
considered the impact of formal knowledge structures
in which the innovator does not know the value of the
patent to the two incumbent firms and the market
structure, but the firms and the PI have full informa-
tion that is shared on the value of the patent and the
market structure under competition. Future research
should take these asymmetries of information into
account. We conjecture that if the PI does not have full
information (the assumption that the firms that oper-
ate in the market have full information is reasonable),
then the PI will play a meaningful role only if innova-
tions are extremely incremental, as they can perform
the market assimilation role in a more restricted
region. In addition, we assumed that there are only
two identical firms for the sake of tractability. Future
research can generalize the results to n incumbent
firms; we expect that our results should be robust to
this generalization in this case. Also, while our focus
is on cost-reducing innovations, a useful future
research avenue will be to map the approach/find-
ings of this paper to feature enhancing innovations.
Unlike our model, such a setting would involve more
nuanced modeling of the end consumer demand
function (as a function of the innovation) which may
lead to newer insights. Finally, future research can
consider generalized demand functions with the
property that the revenue function is concave, and
include other standard assumptions on price elasticity
and demand.
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Appendix
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1. If the PI wins the patent,
then in the licensing subgame, the PI will license the
innovation to both incumbents as it earns 2TPI2 ¼
8ða cÞðc hcÞ
9b [ T
PI
1 ¼ 4ða hcÞðc hcÞ9b , which is the profit
it would earn from licensing to one incumbent only.
The condition for 2TPI2 [ T
PI
1 is h [ 2  ac, and is
satisfied as when the innovation is incremental,
h  hi.
If one of the incumbent firms wins the patent,
it will license to the competitor if 2ða hcÞ
2
9b 
ða 2cþ hcÞ2
9b  ða 2hcþ cÞ
2
9b . Simplifying this condition
shows that it holds if h  53  2a3c, or if the innovation
is incremental. h
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2. If the PI wins the pat-
ent, the then the licensing subgame is identical to
the case in Proposition 1, and the PI prefers to
license the innovation to both incumbents if
h [ hm.
If one the two incumbent firms wins the patent, it
will prefer to use the innovation exclusively if its
profit from exclusive use, ða 2hcþ cÞ
2
9b is greater than
2ða hcÞ2
9b  ða 2cþ hcÞ
2
9b , which is the profit the winning
incumbent gets from licensing to its competitor. This
condition reduces to h\ 53  2a3c ¼ hi. h
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3. If the PI wins the innova-
tion, for only one of the incumbent firms to license
the innovation, from Figure 3, the conditions for a
Nash equilibrium imply that TPI1 has to satisfy
0 ða hcÞ
2
9b
 TPI1
ða hcÞ2
4b
 TPI1 
ða cÞ2
9b
The maximum licensing fee that the PI can charge
from one firm is the maximum value of TPI1 that
satisfies the above inequalities. Since ða hcÞ
2
4b 
ða cÞ2
9b  ða hcÞ
2
9b (
ða cÞ2
9b  ða hcÞ
2
9b ),
TPI1 ¼
ða hcÞ2
4b
 ða cÞ
2
9b
:
Similarly, let TPI2 be the maximum licensing fee
that firm PI can charge to ensure that both firms
enter into a licensing agreement with it. For both
the incumbent firms to license the innovation, from
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Figure 3, the conditions for a Nash equilibrium
imply that TPI2 has to satisfy
0 ða hcÞ
2
9b
 TPI2
ða hcÞ2
4b
 TPI2 
ða cÞ2
9b
Hence, TPI2 ¼ ða hcÞ
2
9b .
It is easy to see that TPI1 ¼ ða hcÞ
2
4b  ða cÞ
2
9b 
2TPI2 ¼ 2ða hcÞ
2
9b if the innovation is radical. To show
ða hcÞ2
4b  ða cÞ
2
9b  2ða hcÞ
2
9b , we need to show that
ða hcÞ2
36b  ða cÞ
2
9b , which reduces to the condition
h  2  ac, which is true if the innovation is radical.
If one of the firms wins the innovation, and deci-
des to license the innovation to the competitor, its
payoff will be ða  hcÞ2=9b þ Ti , where Ti is the
licensing fee. Firm 2’s (1’s) profit will be
ða hcÞ2=9b  Ti. Since firm 2 (1) will not exist in
this case if firm 1 (2) does not license the innovation
to it, Ti ¼ ða  hcÞ2=9b. Therefore, this licensing
yields a profit of 2ða  hcÞ2=9b for firm 1 (2) which
is less than the monopolistic profit ða  hcÞ2=4b.
Therefore, if one of the incumbents wins the innova-
tion, it will choose not to license to its competitor. h
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4. When the innovation is
incremental, the profits of an incumbent firm from
winning the innovation and then licensing it to the
other incumbent are given by E½2ða  hcÞ2=9b  ða
2c þ hcÞ2=9b, and the corresponding profit of the
other incumbent firm is E½ða  2c þ hcÞ2=9b. There-
fore, the willingness to bid for the innovation for the
two incumbents is given by: E½2ða  hcÞ2=9b 2ða
2cþ hcÞ2=9b  ki ¼ 8ða cÞðc hcÞ=9b ki. If the PI
wins the innovation, its net profits from licensing
the innovation to the two incumbents minus its
cost of patenting it are given by: 2E½TPI2   kp ¼
2E½ða  hcÞ2= 9b  ða  2c þ hcÞ2=9b  kp ¼ 8ða cÞ
ðc  hcÞ6=9b  kp. Since kp\ ki, the two incumbents
will bid 8ða  cÞ ðc  hcÞ=9b  ki, and the PI will bid
a marginally higher amount than the incumbent bid:
8ða  cÞðc  hcÞ=9b  ki þ ,  ! 0þ, and win the
innovation. h
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5. When the innovation is
moderate, the optimal licensing strategy of the
incumbent firm is not to license the innovation to its
competitor, and use the innovation exclusively. At
the second (bidding) stage, the profits of an incum-
bent firm from winning the innovation and then
using it exclusively are given by: PWi ¼ E½ða
2hc þ cÞ2=9b  ki. The profit of an incumbent that
does not win the bid for the innovation is given by:
PLi ¼ E½ða  2c þ hcÞ2=9b. Therefore, the maximum
willingness to bid for the innovation for the two
incumbents is given by: PWi  PLi . We have,
PWi PLi ¼
E½ða 2hcþ cÞ2=9b  ki  E½ða 2cþ hcÞ2=9b
¼ E½ða 2hcþ cÞ2=9b ða 2cþ hcÞ2=9b  ki
¼ 1
9b
E½3ðc hcÞð2a c hcÞ  ki
¼ 1
9b
E½3c2h2  3c2  6achþ 6ac  ki
¼ 1
9b
3c2E½h2  3c2  6acE½h þ 6ac  ki
¼ 1
9b
3c2ðr2 þ h2Þ  3c2  6achþ 6ac  ki
¼ 3ðc
hcÞð2a c hcÞ þ 3r2c2
9b
 ki:
Therefore, the maximum willingness to bid for the
innovation for the two incumbents is given by:
PWi  PLi ¼ 3ðc
hcÞð2a c hcÞþ 3r2c2
9b  ki.
If the PI wins the innovation, its net profits from
licensing the innovation to the two incumbents
minus its cost of patenting it are given by:
PPI ¼ 2E½ða  hcÞ2=9b  ða  2c þ hcÞ2=9b  kp ¼
8ða  cÞðc  hcÞ=9b  kp.
Case 1: If PWi PLi ¼ 3ðc
hcÞð2achcÞþ3r2c2
9b  ki[
PPI ¼ 8ða cÞðc hcÞ=9b  kp ) ðc hcÞð5c3hc2aÞþ3r
2c2
9b þ
kp  ki [ 0, then the two incumbent firms have to
bid their maximum willingness to bid to ensure that
they win the innovation, and their bid is given by
3ðc hcÞð2a c hcÞþ 3r2c2
9b  ki. The PI also bids its
maximum profit, and its bid is given by
8ða  cÞðc  hcÞ=9b  kp. One of the two incumbent
firms wins the innovation in this case.
Case 2: If PWi  PLi ¼ 3ðc
hcÞð2a c hcÞþ 3r2c2
9b  ki\
PPI ¼ 8ða cÞðc hcÞ=9b kp ) ðc hcÞð5c3hc2aÞþ3r
2c2
9b þ
kp  ki\ 0, the two incumbent firms bid their maxi-
mum willingness to bid of 3ðc
hcÞð2a c hcÞþ 3r2c2
9b  ki.
The PI bids a marginally higher amount of
3ðc hcÞð5c 2a 3hcÞþ 3r2c2
9b  ki þ ,  ! 0þ, and wins the
innovation. h
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 6. When the innovation is rad-
ical, the optimal licensing strategy of the incumbent
firm is not to license the innovation to its competitor,
and use the innovation exclusively. At the second
(bidding) stage, the profits of the two incumbent
firms from winning the innovation and then using it
exclusively are given by: E½ða  hcÞ2=4b  ki. If the
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incumbent loses, its profit will be zero. Hence, the
willingness to bid for the incumbents is
E½ða  hcÞ2=4b  ki ¼ 14b ½ða  hcÞ2 þ r2c2  ki. The
PI’s profits from winning the innovation are given
by: PPI ¼ E½ða  hcÞ2=4b  ða  cÞ2=9b  kp ¼
1
4b ½ða  hcÞ2 þ r2c2  19b ða  cÞ2  kp.
Case 1: If 19b ða  cÞ2 þ kp  ki [ 0, then the bids
of the two incumbent firms is given by
1
4b ½ða  hcÞ2 þ r2c2  ki. The PI also bids its
maximum profit, and its bid is given by
1
4b ½ða  hcÞ2 þ r2c2  19b ða  cÞ2  kp. One of the
two incumbent firms wins the innovation in this
case.
Case 2: If 19b ða  cÞ2 þ kp  ki\ 0, then the two
incumbent firms will bid 14b ½ða  hcÞ2 þ r2c2  ki.
The PI bids a marginally higher amount of
1
4b ½ða  hcÞ2 þ r2c2  ki þ ,  ! 0þ, and wins the
innovation. h
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 7.
Case 1: If the innovation is incremental, in the
absence of the PI, the two incumbents still submit
their maximum rational bid of 8ða  cÞðc  hcÞ=
9b  ki, hence their profits in equilibrium are
E½ða  2c þ hcÞ2=9b. The incumbent winning the
innovation will license it to its competitor, hence,
both the firms have a unit production cost of hc, and
the price charged of consumers in equilibrium does
not change.
Case 2: If the innovation is moderate, in the
absence of the PI, the two incumbents will
still submit their maximum rational bids of
3ðc hcÞð5c 2a 3hcÞþ 3r2c2
9b  ki, and use the innovation
exclusively, hence, their profits do not change (given
by E½ða  2c þ hcÞ2=9b). However, in this case, the
incumbent winning the innovation uses it exclu-
sively, hence, the other firm has a higher unit
cost of c. This case is identical to the case in Proposi-
tion 5(i), when one of the incumbents wins the
innovation.
However, in the presence of the PI, if
ðc hcÞð5c 3hc 2aÞþ 3r2c2
9b þ kp  ki\ 0, the PI wins the
innovation and licenses it to both incumbents. The
profits of the incumbents are the same in this case
(E½ða  2c þ hcÞ2=9b), but the price charged of
consumers is lower, as both firms have a unit
production cost of hc.
Case 3: If the innovation is radical, then even in
the absence of the PI, the optimal licensing strategy
of the incumbent firm that wins the innovation is
not to license the innovation to its competitor, and
use the innovation exclusively, with its cost being
hc. Therefore, the other firm exits the market, and
the final structure is a monopoly. This is the same
scenario as that in the presence of the PI, therefore,
the price of the product remains the same. However,
both the incumbents stand to earn a zero profit in
this case as the firm that wins the innovation will
do so by paying its maximum willing amount to the
innovator. In the presence of the PI, both incum-
bents stand a chance to earn ða  cÞ2=9b [ 0 (with
a probability of 12), if the PI wins the innovation
(which will happen if kp is significantly lower
than ki). h
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 8. For the incumbent firms,
denote PWi as the profit in the fourth stage if the
firm wins the innovation, and PLi if it loses the inno-
vation to the other incumbent.
If the realized value of h in the fourth stage is in
the incremental region, then from Proposition 4,
PWi ¼ 2ða hcÞ2=9b ða 2cþ hcÞ2=9b ki, PLi ¼ ða
2c þ hcÞ2=9b. Similarly, if the realized value of h
in the fourth stage is in the moderate region, then
from Proposition 5, PWi ¼ ða  2hc þ cÞ2=9b  ki,
PLi ¼ ða  2c þ hcÞ2=9b for the two incumbent
firms. If the realized value of h in the fourth stage is
in the radical region, then from Proposition 6,
PWi ¼ ða  hcÞ2=4b  ki, PLi ¼ 0, for the two
incumbent firms. In the incremental and moderate
regions, PPI ¼ 2½ða  hcÞ2=4b  ða  cÞ2=9b  kp,
and in the radical region, PPI ¼ ða  hcÞ2=4b
ða  cÞ2=9b  kp.
Denote P^Wi as the expected profits of the incum-
bent firms from winning the innovation, and P^Li as
the expected profits of the incumbent firms from
losing the innovation to the other incumbent. Simi-
larly, P^WPI is the expected profit of the PI from win-
ning the innovation. Let Biand BPIdenote the bids of
the incumbent firms and the PI respectively.
For the incumbent’s bid Bi, the following condi-
tion holds: P^Wi  Bi  ki  P^Li . For the patent inter-
mediary’s bid, P^WPI  BPI  kp  0) BPI  P^WPI  kp.
Since the two incumbents are identical and
competitive, their bidding equilibrium is at their
maximum willingness to pay. Hence, Bi ¼ P^Wi 
P^Li  ki. For the patent intermediary to win the
innovation,
max½BPI  ¼ P^WPI  kp  P^Wi  P^Li  ki.
Hence, ki  kp  P^Wi  P^Li  P^WPI .
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) ki  kpZ 1
5
32a3c

2ða hcÞ2  ða 2cþ hcÞ2
9b
 ða 2cþ hcÞ
2
9b
 2ða hcÞ
2  2ða 2cþ hcÞ2
9b

fðhÞdh
þ
Z 5
32a3c
2ac
 ða 2hcþ cÞ2
9b
 ða 2cþ hcÞ
2
9b
 2ða hcÞ
2  2ða 2cþ hcÞ2
9b

fðhÞdh
þ
Z 2ac
0
 ða hcÞ2
4b
 ða hcÞ
2
4b
þ ða cÞ
2
9b

fðhÞdh
Simplifying this equation gives us the result in the
proposition. h
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 9. (i) Here, we assume that
only one of the incumbent firms participates in the
bidding process. When the innovation is incremental,
the profits of an incumbent firm from winning the
innovation and then licensing it to the other
incumbent are given by E½2ða  hcÞ2=9b
ða  2c þ hcÞ2=9b, and the profit of that incum-
bent firm is E½ða  2c þ hcÞ2=9b if the innovation
is won by the PI. Therefore, the willingness to bid
for the innovation for that incumbent is given
by: E½2ða  hcÞ2=9b  2ða  2c þ hcÞ2=9b  ki ¼
8ða  cÞðc  hcÞ=9b  ki. If the PI wins the innova-
tion, its net profits from licensing the innovation
to the two incumbents minus its cost of patenting
it are given by: 2E½TPI2   kp ¼ 2E½ða  hcÞ2=9b
ða  2c þ hcÞ2=9b  kp ¼ 8ða  cÞðc  hcÞ6=9b
kp. Since kp\ ki, the participating incumbent will bid
8ða  cÞðc  hcÞ=9b  ki, and the PI will bid a mar-
ginally higher amount than the incumbent bid: 8ða
cÞðc hcÞ=9b ki þ ,  ! 0þ, and win the innovation.
When the innovation is moderate, the optimal
licensing strategy of the incumbent firm is not to
license the innovation to its competitor, and use the
innovation exclusively. At the second (bidding)
stage, the profits of an incumbent firm from winning
the innovation and then using it exclusively are
given by: PWi ¼ E½ða  2hc þ cÞ2=9b  ki. The
profit of that incumbent by losing the innovation to
the PI firm is given by: PLPIi ¼ E½ða  2c þ hcÞ2=9b.
Therefore, the maximum willingness to bid for the
innovation for the two incumbents is given by:
PWi  PLPIi ¼ 3ðc
hcÞð2a c hcÞþ 3r2c2
9b  ki. If the PI
wins the innovation, its net profits from licensing
the innovation to the two incumbents minus its cost
of patenting it are given by: PPI ¼ 2E½ða  hcÞ2=
9b  ða  2c þ hcÞ2=9b  kp ¼ 8ða  cÞðc  hcÞ=9b
 kp. If PWi PLPIi ¼ 3ðc
hcÞð2a c hcÞþ 3r2c2
9b 
ki [ PPI ¼ 8ða  cÞ ðc  hcÞ=9b  kp ) ðc  hcÞ
ð5c 3hc 2aÞþ 3r2c29bþkp  ki [ 0 , then the incumbent firm will win
the innovation by outbidding the PI. If PWi  PLPIi ¼
3ðc  hcÞð2a  c  hcÞþ 3r2c2
9b ki\PPI ¼ 8ða cÞðc hcÞ=9b kp
) ðc hcÞð5c 3hc 2aÞþ 3r2c29b þ kp  ki\ 0, the PI bids a
marginally higher amount of 3ðc
hcÞð5c 2a 3hcÞþ 3r2c2
9b
 ki þ ,  ! 0þ, and wins the innovation.
When the innovation is radical, the optimal licens-
ing strategy of the incumbent firm is not to license
the innovation to its competitor, and use the innova-
tion exclusively. At the second (bidding) stage, the
profit of the incumbent firm from winning the inno-
vation and then using it exclusively is given by:
E½ða  hcÞ2=4b  ki. If the PI wins the innovation, it
will license the innovation to only one incumbent,
yielding a profit equal to ða cÞ
2
9b for that firm. There-
fore, the expected profit for the incumbent firm if it
loses to the PI in the bidding process is ða cÞ
2
18b .
Hence, the willingness to bid for the incumbents is
E½ða  hcÞ2=4b  ki  ða cÞ
2
18b ¼ 14b ½ða  hcÞ2 þ r2c2
ki  ða cÞ
2
18b . The PI’s profits from winning the
innovation are given by: PPI ¼ E½ða  hcÞ2=4b
ða  cÞ2=9b  kp ¼ 14b ½ða  hcÞ2 þ r2c2  19b ða  cÞ2
kp. If
1
18b ða  cÞ2þ kp  ki [ 0, then the incumbent
firm wins the innovation in this case. If 118b ða  cÞ2þ
kp  ki\ 0, then the incumbent firm will bid
1
4b ½ða  hcÞ2þ r2c2  ki  ða cÞ
2
18b . The PI bids a mar-
ginally higher amount of 14b ½ða  hcÞ2 þ r2c2 
ki  ða cÞ
2
18b þ ,  ! 0þ, and wins the innovation.
(ii) The proof for this part of the proposition fol-
lows directly from the proof of part (i) above and
from the proof of propositions 4 and 5.
(iii) If the probability of one (resp., both) incum-
bent firm(s) of participating in the bidding process
is g (resp., 1  g), then the expected profit of the PI,
conditional on winning the innovation is:
PPI ¼ ki kp ; incremental innovation
¼ ki kpðc
hcÞð5c3hc2aÞþ3r2c2
9b
 ;
moderate innovation
¼ g ki kpða cÞ
2
18b
 
" #
þð1gÞ ki kpða cÞ
2
9b
 
" #
;
radical innovation
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It is easy to observe that for the case with radical
innovation, the PI makes a higher expected profit
when compared to the profit in section 4.3.3. h
Note
1As in Adner and Zemsky (2005), we use Cournot compe-
tition between the incumbent firms as it allows for the
possibility of licensing the innovation to both incumbent
firms.
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